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NOTES
Basis of Liability in a Section 1983 Suit:
When is the State-Of-Mind Analysis Relevant?
Over the past two decades, section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 18711
has been one of the most frequently litigated statutes in the federal courts.
Section 1983 is silent as to the basis for liability 2-that is, whether
negligent, intentional, or reckless conduct3 is required before liability may
be imposed. As a consequence, the questions of whether and when
negligence will support a section 1983 claim remain among the more pro-
minent and difficult issues in section 1983 litigation- issues that have
not yet been resolved satisfactorily by the cases addressing them.
Recently in Procunier v. Navarette,' Baker v. McCollan,5 and Parratt
v. Taylor,' the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether
negligence will support a section 1983 claim.7 In Procunier and Baker the
Court decided on other grounds In Parratt the Court finally addressed
the issue, but decided the case on other grounds.' The Baker Court,
through Justice Rehnquist, observed that whether "simple negligence"
42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13).
2 The section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 282 (1965) defines negligence as "conduct which falls
below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable
risk of harm." Intentional conduct is defined as conduct in which "the actor desires to
cause the consequences of his act:' Id. S 8A. For a discussion and differentiation of negligence,
intended harm, and recklessness, see id. S 282, comments d, e.
434 U.S. 555 (1978).
443 U.S. 137 (1979).
451 U.S. 527 (1981).
Certiorari was granted in Parratt v. Taylor to "be of greater assistance to courts
confronting such a fact situation than it appears we have been in the past." Id. at 533-34.
Assistance was necessary because certiorari was granted twice before, in Procunier and
Baker, to decide whether mere negligence will support a claim under § 1983, but in each
of those cases the Court "found it unnecessary to decide the issue:' Id. at 532.
See text accompanying notes 11-12 & 64-66 infra.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court opinions and, while discussing the state-
of-mind issue in dicta, decided the case on the ground that the post-deprivation tort remedies
that the state of Nebraska provided as a means of redress for the complainant's property
deprivations satisfied the requirements of procedural due process. 451 U.S. at 537-44.
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states a claim for relief under section 1983 "may well not be susceptible
of a uniform answer across the entire spectrum of conceivable constitu-
tional violations which might be the subject of a section 1983 action."'"
The Baker Court further noted that regardless of whether state of mind
is relevant to stating a cause of action under section 1983, state of mind
"may be relevant on the issue of whether a constitutional violation has
occurred in the first place."" Yet the Baker Court found it unnecessary
to discuss the significance of thus keeping distinct these state-of-mind
analyses because the Court found no constitutional violation and held that
in the absence of a constitutional violation "the state of mind of the defen-
dant is wholly immaterial."'" Realizing that the Baker decision had not
given the lower courts sufficient guidance on the issue of negligence,
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality in Parratt, emphasized that
section 1983 has no express requirement of a particular state of mind.'3
Thus, the Court ambiguously acknowledged that negligence may be ac-
tionable under section 1983 and that the state-of-mind analysis may not
always be relevant to the statement of a cause of action."'
The purpose of this note is to examine when the state-of-mind analysis
is relevant in a section 1983 suit. This note argues that the state-of-mind
inquiry becomes most relevant in determining whether the defendant has
available an affirmative defense against liability in a section 1983 suit
involving a plaintiff seeking monetary damages. 5 This note argues fur-
ther that whether the state-of-mind analysis is relevant when the plain-
tiff is establishing the elements of his cause of action in a section 1983
suit may depend on which constitutional right the plaintiff alleges has
been violated.'6 Although the Court has never ruled on the merits that
10 443 U.S. at 139-40.
Id. at 140 n.1.
1 Id. at 140. It was after this statement that the Baker Court placed footnote 1. For
a summary of footnote 1, see text accompanying note 11 supra.
" 451 U.S. at 533-35 (citing Baker and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)).
" Id. at 534-35.
" The Court has implied in dictum that a defendant's negligent state of mind may be
sufficient to establish his responsibility for a constitutional deprivation, see Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. at 536, but the Court has never upheld on the merits a S 1983 claim premised
on negligence. Therefore, it is the position of this note that the only clear and meaningful
state-of-mind analysis presently engaged in by the Court is the analysis that applies to
the determination of whether to grant the defendant an affirmative defense and what type
of remedy is appropriate for the plaintiff.
16 Some commentators think that the state-of-mind inquiry should only be relevant in
determining whether there has been a constitutional violation, and then the state of mind
required to state a § 1983 claim should vary depending on which particular constitutional
right was allegedly violated. See Kirkpatrick, Defining a Constitutional Tort Under Section
1988: The State-Of-Mind Requirement, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 45,49 (1977); McClellan & Northcross,
Remedies & Damages for Violation of Constitutional Rights, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 409,415 (1980).
Another view asserts that the state-of-mind inquiry is irrelevant and only obstructs the
operation of S 1983. See Note, Section 1988 Liability for Negligence, 58 NEB. L. REV. 271,
282-83 (1978).
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negligence will satisfy the threshold cause-of-action requirement, the Court
in dicta has suggested that negligent conduct may be actionable under
section 1983 for the violation of some constitutional rights but not others.'7
As a necessary corollary to this view, this note argues that even if
negligence is found to suffice for a cause of action, such a development
will not open the floodgates for section 1983 litigation because of the in-
herent safeguards against liability provided by the interplay of defenses
and remedies under section 1983. Only after examining the state-of-mind
analysis relevant to defenses and remedies can one fully comprehend the
difficulty the Court has had in articulating whether or when state of mind
is relevant in stating a cause of action under section 1983.
This note focuses first on the historical development of the Court's state-
of-mind analysis, then examines the mechanics of a section 1983 suit to
determine when the state-of-mind analysis is most relevant and how the
courts should implement this analysis. The note subsequently concentrates
on questions of liability and in particular analyzes the relationship that
exists between section 1983 defenses and remedies. The last section of
the note provides a framework to illustrate the pitfalls a section 1983
plaintiff faces if negligence will suffice to establish a cause of action, to
defeat any defenses, and to justify a remedy. The note suggests under
what circumstances negligence might satisfy section 1983's threshold
cause-of-action requirement and also withstand any affirmative defenses
pleaded by the defendant.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE-OF-MIND "REQUIREMENT"
Before Monroe v. Pape,'8 little case law dealt with violations of section
1983.'" Rather, most of the civil rights litigation before Monroe involved
18 U.S.C. 5 242, the criminal analogue to section 1983." The leading case
discussing a state-of-mind requirement under section 242 is Screws v.
United States,2 ' in which the Court decided that before criminal liability
may be imposed, the government must show that the defendant's state
of mind amounted to scienter, that is, fulfilled the requirement of inten-
'7 See notes 38-39, 121-23 & accompanying text infra.
'a 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Monroe v. Pape was overruled in part by Monell v. Dep't of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
"1 See Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of An Adequate Civil Remedy?, 26 IND.
L.J. 361 (1951). See generally Comment, The Evolution of the State of Mind Requirement
of Section 1983, 47 TUL. L. REv. 870 (1973).
11 9 242 states: "Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom,
willfully subjects any inhabitant of any state .... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States ...
shall be fined ... or... subject to imprisonment .... " 18 U.S.C. S 242 (1976) (emphasis
added). For examples of the Supreme Court cases construing S 242, see G. GUNTHER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1038-42 (10th ed. 1980).
21 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
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tional or willful conduct called for under the statute. In this context the
Court began to lay the groundwork for developing the federal common
law standard for the state of mind needed to maintain a cause of action
under section 1983.
The section 1983 action brought in Monroe involved intentional con-
duct by the defendants.22 Nevertheless, Justice Douglas in his majority
opinion in Monroe suggested that the scienter requirement in section 242
should not carry over to section 1983 when he stated:
In the Screws case we dealt with a statute that imposed criminal
penalties for acts 'willfully' done. We construed that word in its set-
ting to mean the doing of an act with 'a specific intent to deprive
a person of a federal right.' We do not think that gloss should be placed
on [section 19831 which we have here. The word 'willfully' does not
appear in [section 1983]. Moreover, [section 1983] provides a, civil
remedy, while in the Screws case we dealt with a criminal law challenged
on the grounds of vagueness. [Section 1983] should be read against
the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the
natural consequences of his actions."
As recently as Parratt v. Taylor,24 the Court acknowledged that the
decisions in Monroe and Baker v. McCollan' suggest "that section 1983
affords a 'civil remedy' for deprivations of federally protected rights
caused by persons acting under color of state law without any express
requirement of a particular state of mind."26 The lower courts, however,
did not enjoy the advantage of hindsight and many of the section 1983
decisions in the 1960's and 1970's found the lower courts trying to define
a nonexistent requirement. As the lower courts interpreted Monroe's
"against the background of tort liability" language, two divergent views
developed over the state of mind of the defendant that the plaintiff must
allege to state a section 1983 claim. A majority of the circuit courts ad-
dressing the issue held that an action based on mere negligence did not
state a claim under section 1983;27 the minority position indicated that
negligence would satisfy the state-of-mind requirement.28 However,
The plaintiff alleged that 13 Chicago police officers broke into his house without a
warrant and forced him and his family to get out of bed and stand naked while the police
ransacked the house. Subsequently, the police allegedly took the plaintiff into custody and
held him at the police station for 10 hours without filing charges, allowing him to call an
attorney, or taking him before a magistrate. 365 U.S. at 169.
Id. at 187 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
451 U.S. 527 (1981).
443 U.S. 137 (1979).
451 U.S. at 535.
2' See, e.g., Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976); Williams v. Vincent, 508
F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974); Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1973); Williams v.
Field, 416 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1016 (1970); Daniels v. Van De
Venter, 382 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1967).
, See, e.g., McCollan v. Tate, 575 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, sub
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the support the minority view provides for the proposition that mere
negligence is actionable under Section 1983 may be generally dismissed
as dicta. These cases either involve intentional or reckless conduct
with a failure to appreciate that the result of the conduct would be
unconstitutional or negligent conduct which results in the depriva-
tion of a clearly established constitutional right independent of a
generalized claim based on substantive due process. Negligent con-
duct, without more, resulting in an injury to a property right does
not seem to have direct support even in those Circuits subscribing
to the minority view.'
Therefore, what began in Monroe as the absence of any state-of-mind
requirement ironically evolved into a scienter 0 requirement in the lower
courts, only to undergo a full-circle return twenty years later in Parratt,3 '
which seemingly rejected a uniform state-of-mind requirement.
If no rigid state-of-mind requirement exists to state a prima facie
section 1983 cause of action, the inquiry becomes whether the state-of-
mind analysis is ever relevant in a section 1983 suit. By examining the
nom. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d 277 (9th Cir.
1976), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); McCray
v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1972); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 418 (1972); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969).
The Fifth Circuit still holds that a S 1983 claim can be premised on gross negligence
(somewhere in between intentional and negligent conduct). See Wright v. El Paso County
Jail, 642 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[Tjhere must be at least some allegation of a con-
scious or callous indifference to a prisoner's rights, thus raising the tort to constitutional
stature.").
Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 568 n.8 (7th Cir. 1976). For examples of cases in
which the conduct was intentional or reckless but there was no intent to deprive the plain-
tiff of constitutional rights, see Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 81 (3d Cir. 1965); Stringer
v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536, 540 (10th Cir. 1963).
The Court has yet to fully explain what makes a right "clearly established" as com-
pared to another right secured by the Constitution. See notes 69-71 & accompanying text
infra. The suggestion that constitutional rights established within the Bill of Rights are
more settled and should be differentiated from substantive and procedural due process
rights is inadequate. An argument can be made that the right to a first trimester abortion
is at least as "clearly established" as the fine discriminations the Court has made regard-
ing freedom of speech. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), with Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
1 The term "scienter" is used in this note to indicate intentional, willful conduct as
opposed to negligence. This usage prevails in other areas of law, especially the field of
securities fraud. Comparisions will be made in this note between the state-of-mind con-
troversy in S 1983 suits and the similar difficulties the Court has experienced in deciding
whether negligence satisfies the scienter requirement of statutes governing securities fraud.
For the latter, see Aaron v. Kyle, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976). Any comparison made is intended only as a heuristic device, however, because
many factual, jurisprudential, and policy differences exist between civil rights litigation
and securities litigation.
" The Court in Parratt acknowledged the confusion regarding scienter when it stated
that it must "once more put [its] shoulder to the wheel hoping to be of greater assistance
to courts confronting such a fact situation than it appears we have been in the past." 451
U.S. at 533-34.
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mechanics of a section 1983 suit, one may obtain greater insight into when
the state-of-mind inquiry is most germane.
MECHANICS OF A SECTION 1983 SUIT AND
THE COURT'S STATE-OF-MIND ANALYSIS
The Plaintiff's Burden: Stating the Claim
There are two elements a plaintiff must establish in order to state a
section 1983 claim: first, that the plaintiff has been deprived of a right
secured by the Federal Constitution and laws;"2 and second, that the defen-
dant acted under color of state law." As the Baker court stated: "The
first inquiry in any section 1983 suit.., is whether the plaintiff has been
deprived of a right 'secured by the Constitution and laws.' ,,34 Based on
the language of the statute, however, it is difficult to see how the defen-
dant's state of mind per se is relevant to whether the plaintiff has alleg-
ed the two elements necessary to state a cause of action under section
1983.35
Although the Court in Baker noted that the defendant's state of mind
may be relevant in deciding whether a constitutional deprivation
actionable under section 1983 has occurred in the first place,' the Court
has never fully explained its position on this issue.3 ' The Court has
ambiguously indicated that the state of mind needed to state a claim may
vary according to the particular constitutional right violated.' A good
example of the Court's differential state-of-mind analysis is expressed in
Parratt as follows:
The only deprivation respondent alleges in his complaint is that 'his
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, recently expanded the mean-
ing of the "and laws" language to include violations of federal statutory as well as constitu-
tional law. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). See generally Note, Section 1983: Carte
Blanche Remedy For Federal Statutory Violations?, 10 STETSON L. REV. 506 (1981).
33 See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brook, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978). The lower courts, following
the Supreme Court, place the initial burden of establishing these two elements on the plain-
tiff. See, e.g., Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1980); Riccobono v. Whitpain
Township, 497 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
443 U.S. at 140.
Section 1983 is silent as to what state of mind is required before a claim has been
stated. See note 2 supra.
' 443 U.S. at 140 n.1. The Baker Court did not elaborate on the significance the defen-
dant's state of mind may have to the determination of whether a claim has been stated
under S 1983 and to whether a "defendant may be held to respond in damages under the
provisions." Id.
' In fact the Court has never held on the merits that negligence satisfied the S 1983
constitutional deprivation requirement.
See notes 118-23 & accompanying text infra.
[Vol. 57:459
SECTION 1983
United States were violated. That he was deprived of his property and
Due Process of Law.' As such, respondent's claims differ from the claims
which were before us in Monroe v. Pape, which involved violation of the
FourthAmendment, and the claims presented in Estelle v. Gamble, which
involved alleged violations ofthe EighthAmendment .... Respondent here
refers to no other right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitu-
tion or federal laws other than the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment simpliciter.Y
In contrast to the amorphous state of the law regarding the state-of-
mind analysis in the establishment of a section 1983 cause of action, the
law on the state-of-mind analysis relevant to defenses and remedies is
well developed." Indeed, the Court's main focus-in terms of the state-
of-mind analysis in a section 1983 suit-has been on the defendant's state
of mind relevant to defenses and remedies.41 By focusing on defenses and
remedies, one may more readily see why the Court has experienced so
much difficulty in dealing with the issue of whether negligence may suf-
fice to state a cause of action under section 1983.
The Defendant's Burden: Establishing a Good Faith Defense42
If the plaintiff establishes the two elements of a section 1983 claim,4"
the burden shifts to the defendant to establish a qualified immunity
through proof "that his conduct was justified by an objectively reasonable
belief that it was lawful."" The Court in Gomez v. Toledo4 5 further noted
that "[s]ince qualified immunity is a defense, the burden of pleading it
rests with the defendant."4
As federal courts have searched for principles to limit and define the
451 U.S. at 536 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
" The Court has explicitly explained the state-of-mind analysis vis-a-vis affirmative
defenses. See notes 42-65 & accompanying text infra.
4' See id.
42 This note will discuss the state-of-mind analysis in its relation to defenses only in
the context of qualified immunities. The reader should be aware that other immunities
exist. Legislators are afforded an absolute immunity, which means that such defendants
do not have to contest the case on its merits. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-75
(1951). Prosecutors and judges are also protected under the absolute immunity doctrine.
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)
(judges). Another defense available to defendants is the running of the statute of limita-
tions. See, e.g., Dumas v. Town of Mt. Vernon, Ala., 612 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1980); Lavellee
v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1980); Leigh v. McGuire, 613 F2d 380 (2d Cir. 1979); Jackson
v. Hayakawa, 605 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1979).
" See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
" Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
"Id.
's Id. at 640. One Justice argued that the Gomez decision puts the burden of going for-
ward on the defendant and leaves open the issue of whether the defendant has the burden
of persuasion. Id. at 642 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
1982]
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liability of state officials in section 1983 suits, the defense of qualified
immunity47 has undergone significant development and implementation
in civil rights and liberties litigation. The tests and policies underlying
when a qualified immunity defense will be granted are crucial because
in effect the judicial contours of this defense determine what types of
conduct will be deemed permissible under section 1983.8 One of the
reasons courts have had difficulty articulating whether and when the state-
of-mind analysis should be applied during the cause-of-action phase is the
confusing circumstance that the judicial tests developed for the defense
of qualified immunity concentrate heavily on the defendant's state of
mind. 9 Some courts have confused the state-of-mind analysis at the cause-
of-action phase with the scope of a particular defendant's immunity from
a damage action. 0
Pierson v. Ray5 was the first case in which the Supreme Court
recognized the qualified immunity defense in a section 1983 suit. There
the defense was upheld when a police officer had "act[ed] under a statute
that he reasonably believed to be valid but that was later held
unconstitutional."52 The Pierson Court reasoned that the tradition of im-
munity was so firmly rooted in common law and policy that "Congress
would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine."-"
The Court's next decision having an impact on the qualified immunity
doctrine was Scheuer v. Rhodes,' which considered whether a qualified
immunity defense should be granted to the Governor of Ohio and his subor-
dinates for their indirect involvement in the slayings of three Kent State
University students by the National Guard." The Scheuer Court
acknowledged that evaluating high-level executives' decisions necessar-
ily involved a more complex inquiry than the decision in Pierson of
whether police conduct has complied with the requirement of good faith
'" The terms "qualified immunity" and "good faith defense" are interchangeable. See
Laverne v. Corning, 522 F.2d 1144, 1147 (2d Cir. 1975).
4' The scope of the qualified immunity defense defines the class of claims that may be
recognized under S 1983 because it makes little sense to state that the plaintiff has a cause
of action when the effect of an affirmative defense is to deny relief. Otherwise stated,
defenses help define which torts committed by state officials may be deemed to be of con-
stitutional magnitude.
41 See notes 61-68 & accompanying text infra.
" See, e.g., Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819, 831 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866
(1971); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 399 F. Supp. 695, 698 (N.D. Ill. 1972), rev'd sub nom.
Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 754 (1980).
386 U.S. 547 (1967).
Id. at 555.
Id. at 554-55. But see Theis, "Good Faith" as a Defense to Suits for Police Deprivations
of Individual Rights, 59 MINN. L. REV. 991, 1009-10 (1975) (suggesting that the Pierson test
and the way it has been read by lower courts constitute a misreading of the common law
good faith defense).
" 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
' Id. at 238-50.
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because of the broad range of different decisions a high-ranking official
must make. As the underlying rationale for its decision, the Scheuer Court
attempted to balance and to reconcile the competing policy considerations
of deterring constitutional violations and protecting the discretionary deci-
sionmaking powers of executive state officials.' The Court adopted a rule
establishing that "in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to
officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being depen-
dent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and
all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the ac-
tion on which liability is ... based."58
After the decision in Scheuer, the Court expressly stated in Wood v.
Strickland5 9 how these competing policy considerations should be
balanced.5 The Wood Court promulgated a two-pronged test involving
both objective and subjective components when it stated:
[A] school board member is not immune from liability for damages
under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action
he took ... would violate the constitutional rights of the student af-
fected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause
a deprivation of constitutional rights .... 11
Although the Wood Court limited its opinion to "the specific context of
school discipline,"" the Court subsequently extended the defense of
qualified immunity to a state hospital superintendent.' In Procunier v.
I Id. at 246-47.
17 See id. at 246-49. For an excellent overall discussion of the policies behind the com-
mon law rule of protecting discretionary decisionmaking, see Freed, Executive Official Im-
munity for Constitutional Violations: An Anlalysis & Critique, 72 Nw. L. REv. 526 (1977).
The main policies underlying the principle of qualified immunity are: first, it would be
unfair to penalize an official when there is a duty to decide; second, threat of liability will
encourage cowardly decisionmaking and may discourage individuals from entering public
service; and third, if government officials must spend their time defending lawsuits rather
than governing, then government in general will be less effective. Id. at 529-30.
The common law established the distinction between "ministerial" acts ("obedience to
orders or the performance of a duty in which the officer is left no choice of his own")
and "discretionary" acts (those "requiring personal deliberation, decision and judgment"),
allowing a qualified immunity for the latter, but no immunity for the former. See W. PRO-
SSER, THE LAW OF TORTS S 132, at 988-90 (4th ed. 1971).
1' 416 U.S. at 247. The court of appeals in Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir.
1972), rev'd and remanded, sub nom. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), had granted
the governor an absolute immunity, but the Supreme Court was concerned that this would
be too broad an extension of the absolute immunity defense.
s, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
o Wood involved the suspension from school of two students who alleged they were
denied procedural due process by school officials. Id. at 309-10.
1 Id. at 322 (emphasis added). It is important to note that the qualified immunity defense
was directed toward a S 1983 suit seeking monetary damages, for the type of remedy sought
is a primary factor in determining whether an immunity defense should be recognized.
See notes 84-106 & accompanying text infra.
' 420 U.S. at 322.
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
1982]
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Navarette64 the Court explained how the test for evaluating the qualified
immunity defense set forth in Scheuer and Wood was to be applied in
a case involving negligent conduct. 5 The Procunier decision interpreted
the objective prong of the Wood test to mean that the qualified immunity
defense would be unavailing if the constitutional right allegedly infringed
was "clearly established" at the time of the deprivation, so that the officials
knew or should have known of the existence of the right and that their
conduct would violate it.66
Under the qualified immunity test established in Wood and Procunier,
the availability of the defense thus depends primarily upon whether the
constitutional right was "clearly established" at the time of the defen-
dant's action.' Only when the right is determined to be "clearly estab-
lished" will the official not be protected by his subjective good faith, which
is to say that this is the only situation in which a claim based on negligence
will survive the defense. 8 Section 1983 case law has not yet absorbed
the full impact of the phrase "clearly established rights," and the Court
has not yet set forth any guidelines or principles to indicate what makes
one right secured by the Constitution and laws more "clearly established"
than another, similarly protected right. 9 Nevertheless, based on the ra-
tionale for qualified immunity -exonerating state officials from liability
when to do otherwise would be to hold officials responsible for "predic-
ting the future course of constitutional law" 0 - one of the factors that
may have a bearing on the determination of whether a right was "clearly
434 U.S. 555 (1978).
The plaintiff's complaint alleged, inter alia, that subordinate prison officials "'negligent-
ly and inadvertently' misapplied the prison mail regulations" and that supervisory officials
"'negligentlyf failed to provide sufficient training and direction to their subordinates,"
in violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Id. at 558.
" Id. at 565. The Court stated that in 1971 and 1972 there was no first amendment
right protecting the mailing privilege of state prisoners and hence there were no "clearly
established rights" involved in the case. Id. The Procunier Court's "clearly established
rights" theory may be criticized as giving state officials one "free" constitutional violation.
See Freed, supra note 57, at 558.
" See, e.g., Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 163 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
827 (1980); Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399, 411 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1980);
Princeton Community Phone Book, Inc. v. Bate, 582 F.2d 706, 711-13 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978); Sullivan v. Meade Independent School Dist. No. 101, 530 F.2d
799, 806 (8th Cir. 1976).
" See, e.g., Francia v. White, 594 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1979); Ware v. Heyne, 575 F.2d
593 (7th Cir. 1978); Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
910 (1978); Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975); Bradford v. Edelstein, 467 F.
Supp. 1361 (S.D. Tex. 1979).69 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that many officials' jobs affect a broad range
of rights protected by the Constitution and laws, while other officials' decisions affect a
limited range of federally protected rights.
70 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967), quoted in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at
322; see O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975) ("[A]n official has . . . no duty
to anticipate unforeseeable constitutional developments.").
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established" at the time in question is the identity of the official being
sued and the extent of his duty to know the law.7
The availability of the defense of qualified immunity is not controlled
solely, however, by whether the right alleged to have been violated is
"clearly established." Also relevant are the type of remedy the plaintiff
seeks 2 and whether the plaintiff is suing an official individually, as
distinguished from an action brought against a muncipality for the action
of its officials.
In Monell v. Department of Social Services,73 the Court overruled a prece-
dent of not allowing section 1983 suits against municipalities 4 by holding
that a municipality is a "person" within the meaning of section 1983.15
However, the Court made it clear that the plaintiff's complaint must allege
more than a cause of action based on respondeat superior.76 To prevail
on the merits the plaintiff must prove that the deprivation of his constitu-
tional or federal statutory right was the result of the municipality's
"official policy.""
Although the Monell decision established that municipalities are not
entitled to absolute immunity, 8 the Court expressly left open the question
of whether they are entitled to a qualified immunity. 9 A sharply divided
Court in Owen v. City of Independence" subsequently held that a
municipality may not assert the good faith of its officers or agents as
a defense to liability under section 1983." Thus, if a plaintiff can prove
" For example, in Jackson v. Mississippi, 644 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1981), the court held
that the qualified immunity defense did not apply because the defendants, prison officials
and members of the Mississippi State Penitentiary Board, violated a "clearly established"
constitutional right of the plaintiff. The right had been established in Gates v. Collier,
349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), which held that the prison practice challenged by the
plaintiff in Jackson violated the eighth amendment rights of prisoners. While the defen-
dants in Jackson had a duty to know of the Gates decision because it involved matters
directly within their job responsibilities, other state officials whose jobs were further remov-
ed from such matters may have had a lesser duty to know of the Gates decision. Therefore,
it is possible that if more remote officials had been sued, the court would not have found
that Gates "clearly established" a constitutional right.
" See notes 84-106 & accompanying text infra.
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. at 191 n.50).
" 436 U.S. at 690.
7" Id. at 691.
1 Id Like respondeat superior, this theory can result in the liability of a municipality
for the actions of its subordinate employees, as well as for the actions of its policymakers.
See Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981) (city liable for conduct of its police
officer because this conduct resulted from city policy of inadequate training, supervision,
and discipline of police).
,8 436 U.S. at 701.
79 Id-
445 U.S. 622 (1980).
' Id at 650.
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a deprivation of a constitutional or federal statutory right caused by the
execution of a municipality's policy, then he arguably will have a strict
liability section 1983 action against the municipality.' In terms of the state-
of-mind analysis, the impact of Monell and Owen arguably is to preclude
a state-of-mind inquiry in a section 1983 suit brought against a municipal
defendant. It may be argued, however, that to prove an official policy
or custom after Monell the plaintiff must prove a "continuing failure to
remedy known unconstitutional conduct,"' and that the municipality's con-
duct in such a case is tantamount to intentional behavior.
Relating Defenses to Remedies"
Whether and to what extent a defendant is afforded a defense in a
section 1983 suit is frequently a function of the type of remedy the plain-
tiff is seeking. More importantly, the remedy sought by the plaintiff often
depends on the state of mind of the defendant at the time of the alleged
constitutional violation.85 Therefore, the relationships between defenses
and remedies and the defendant's state of mind at the time of the alleged
deprivation are critical to the determination of the state of mind needed
to sustain a section 1983 suit.
One type of remedy available to a section 1983 plaintiff is an injunction.'
An "injunction is a personal command to the defendant to act or avoid
acting in a certain way";"7 in the context of section 1983, an injunction
usually is a command to the defendant to cease acting in a manner that
deprives the plaintiff of his constitutional rights. However, the courts
have not explained whether a showing of scienter as opposed to negligence
is required to establish the requisite state of mind before an injunction
will be issued; instead, the courts frequently state quite generally that
' This is strict liability in that the defendant's state of mind is irrelevant. Some com-
mentators have criticized the strict liability potential in S 1983 suits against municipalities
created by Owen. See, e.g., Comment, Strict Liability Under Section 1983 for Municipal
Deprivations of Federal Rights?: Owen v. City of Independence, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 153
(1980).
Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F2d at 1224.
" This note focuses on injunctions and compensatory and punitive damages as remedies.
The most frequently litigated issue in the area of remedies is attorneys' fees and how
42 U.S.C. S 1988 (1976) is to be interpreted. For an excellent analysis of the factors (the
court listed 12) involved in attorney's fees, see Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 616 F.2d 598, 600
n.3 (st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980).
1 This is especially true for damage actions because the defendant's state of mind deter-
mines the availability of compensatory or punitive damages in S 1983 suits. See text accom-
panying notes 95-106 infra.
I See, e.g., Hansbury v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 596 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1979); Duchesne
v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.
1976), rev'd in part, 436 U.S. 547 (1977); Rowley v. McMillen, 502 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1974).
" D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 1.1, at 2 (1973).
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"it is well settled that government immunity is not a defense to a prayer
for injunctive relief."" The courts often discuss policy reasons to explain
why the qualified immunity defense is not applicable in suit seeking in-
junctive relief by distinguishing the purpose of money damages from that
of injunctive relief.89 In Rowley v. McMillan9 the court explained that
the immunity rule, whatever its scope, is grounded upon the inhibitory
effect of suits for money damages. Manifestly, actions for injunctive
relief do not have that effect. The federal defendants have cited no case,
and we have found none, which holds that the immunity doctrine in-
sulates a public official or public employee from injunctive relief... 91
Another court based its reasoning for not allowing a qualified immunity
defense in a suit for injunctive relief on the fact that a number of the
policies for allowing a qualified immunity apply only to civil actions for
damages. 2
A number of commentators have called for a greater use by the federal
courts of injunctive relief in section 1983 suits.' Although the use of
U Newsome v. Sielaff, 375 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (ED. Pa. 1974); accord Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. at 315 n.6; National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 609 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 472 F.2d 732, 734 (3d Cir. 1973); Saffron v.
Wilson, 70 F.R.D. 51, 56 n.4 (D.D.C. 1975). See also Friedman, The Good Faith Defense In
Constitutional Litigation, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 501 (1977). In the area of securities fraud, the
Court recently confronted the issue of whether scienter or negligence satisfies the state-
of-mind requirement for an injunction under S 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
S 77t(b) (1976), and S 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976).
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). The Court held that scienter is required for an injunc-
tion against violations of S 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 5 78j(b)
(1976), and S 17a(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. S 77q(a)(1) (1976), but scienter
is not required for an injunction against violations of S 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. S 77q(aX2) (1976), and S 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(aX3) (1976). 446 U.S. at 701-02. The Chief Justice, in separate opinion, concluded that
"[ilt will almost always be necessary for [the plaintiff] to demonstrate that the defendant's
past sins have been the result of more than negligence," because an injunction will issue
only upon a showing of "a reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be repeated:' Id. at
703 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added). In a § 1983 case, it may be argued that
once the plaintiff has filed for injunctive relief, the defendant has been put on notice that
the conduct may be unconstitutional, and the defendant who continues his questioned ac-
tions then engages in intentional conduct and should no longer be able to claim a subjec-
tive good faith defense. See Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611,.615 (6th Cir. 1980). From this
argument one may surmise that when the plaintiff has met the burden of proof for injunc-
tive relief, exclusive of any state-of-mind requirement, the plaintiff has automatically pro-
ven more than negligence and has in fact proven scienter.
I See, e.g., Hansbury v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 596 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1979); Stanford
Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd in part, 436 U.S. 547 (1977); Rowley
v. McMillan, 502 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1974).
502 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1974).
9' Id. at 1332.
Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 412-13 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, sub
non. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
11 E.g., Hansen, Use of The Federal Injunction To Protect Constitutional Rights: Rizzo
v. Goode and The Control of Governmental Bureaucracies, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 231 (1977); Whit-
19821
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
federal equitable relief has recently grown, there remain many doctrines
and techniques available to federal courts to avoid issuing injuncitve
relief,' a fact that necessitates examination of the other remedies available
under section 1983.
Although the good faith defense does not apply in suits for injunctive
relief, the same is not true when the plaintiff is seeking monetary damages.
The qualified immunity concept grew out of the law's concern for not
holding an official liable in damages because to hold otherwise would
undermine the official's ability to perform his duties.'5 Of the three types
of damage remedies - nominal, compensatory, and punitive - only punitive
damages expressly take into account the defendant's state of mind in im-
posing liability. If the plaintiff shows that the defendant's state of mind
amounted to scienter at the time of the alleged deprivation of a right
secured by the Constitution and laws, then the courts have often found
that the resulting injury is egregious enough to award punitive damages -
even in the absence of actual loss to the plaintiff. 6 The rationale for
punitive damages demands that they only be awarded as punishment or
as a deterrent.9 The courts should award punitive damages only when
the conduct is particularly egregious -that is, accompanied by an element
of scienter- because the extra liability imposed by punitive damages cuts
against the purposes served by the qualified immunity defense. Courts
rarely award punitive damages in section 1983 suits, and the use of
punitive damages was expressly limited in City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts," in which the Supreme Court held that punitive damages could
not be assessed against municipalities.9
The seminal section 1983 damages case is Carey v. Piphus,0 ' in which
the Court had to decide whether to grant compensatory or nominal
damages for the negligent deprivation of a constitutional right and held
that in the absence of proof of actual injury' the plaintiff was only en-
man, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1, 41-52 (1980) (discussing the advantages of in-
junctive relief compared to monetary damages). For a general discussion of the role of
injunctive relief in civil rights litigation, see 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978).
1 This note does not address the issues surrounding the federal courts' reluctance to
use injunctive relief in section 1983 suits. For a discussion of this issue, see Fiss, Dom-
browski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977).
Is See note 57 supra.
See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.11 (1978); Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554
(7th Cir. 1974); Morrison v. Fox, 483 F. Supp. 390 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
9 D. DOBBS, supra note 87, S 3.9 at 204.
453 U.S. 247 (1981).
" The Court's reasoning focused on the common law tort principle that there cannot
be punitive damages against a municipality because such awards burden the very taxpayers
and citizens for whose benefit the wrongdoers have been punished. Id. at 266-71.
11 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
101 Id- at 264. The Carey court found no proof of actual injury from the mere fact that
students were suspended for 20 days in violation of their procedural due process rights.
See id. at 262-63. However, the Carey court did recognize that the plaintiffs could recover
for emotional or mental distress upon proper proof. Id. at 262.
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titled to nominal (one dollar) damages."2 The Carey opinion stated that
in the decision whether actual injury has occurred, the particular con-
stitutional right deprived and the interests protected by that right will
be determinative.10 3 Only in the context of discussing the district court's
holding that the defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity"0 4 did
the Carey Court address the defendants' state of mind. The Court con-
cluded that an "injury caused by a justified deprivation ... is not proper-
ly compensable under § 1983" when the only constitutional violation pro-
ven is that the deprivation was accomplished in a manner violative of
the plaintiff's right to procedural due process. ' Therefore, the only time
the plaintiff will carry a section 1983 claim to a jury on the issue of com-
pensatory damages will be when the defendant has deprived the plaintiff
of a judicially determined "clearly established" right and the plaintiff
alleges actual injury caused by this deprivation. ' Due to the relation-
ship between defenses and damages, the Court's analysis makes it very
unlikely that courts would impose monetary damages for negligent con-
duct even if claims premised on mere negligence were to be recognized.
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST UNLIMITED CLAIMS
AND LIABILITY BASED ON NEGLIGENCE
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the merits that a claim
based on negligence will suffice to state a cause of action under section
102 Id. at 266-67. But cf. Burt v. Able, 585 F.2d 613, 616 n.7 (4th Cir. 1978) (stating that
Carey establishes that the appropriate remedy for procedural due process violations is
compensatory damages).
'° 435 U.S. at 259. Compare Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
with Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 259. In Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir.
1979), the Court held that Carey's requirement of proof of actual injury did not apply to
fourth amendment violations because the nature of the interests involved differed from
those involved in procedural due process rights. For an excellent overall analysis on this
point, see Note, Damage Awards For Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration After Carey
v. Piphus, 93 HARV. L. REv. 966 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Damage Awards]. See also
Note, "Damages or Nothing"-The Efficacy of the Bivens-Type Remedy, 64 CORNELL L. REV.
667 (1978).
10, 435 U.S. at 251 & n.6. This discussion was unnecessary, however, because the peti-
tioners had not challenged the district court's holding that the defendants were not en-
titled to qualified immunity because Linwood v. Bd. of Educ. of Peoria, 463 F.2d 763 (7th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972), had clearly established that the defendants'
actions violated the plaintiffs' rights to procedural due process. See 435 U.S. at 251 & n.6.
, 5 435 U.S. at 263. In order to be entitled to compensatory damages under S 1983, the
plaintiff must prove an injury caused by the deprivation of procedural due process itself,
rather than by the justified, though procedurally flawed, deprivation of his liberty, proper-
ty, or other rights. See id.
11 If he does not allege actual injury, according to Carey, he is only entitled to nominal
damages. If he is only entitled to nominal damages, then he has no seventh amendment
right to a jury trial. See Burt v. Able, 585 F.2d at 616 n.7.
One commentator has suggested that a minimum "floor" be established for such claims
to avoid the apparent scandal of having the plaintiff discover that his constitutional rights
are only worth one dollar. See Note, Damage Awards, supra note 103, at 988-89.
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1983, 17 even if the Court so ruled, there are adequate safeguards within
the present mode of analysis to thwart any undesirable proliferation of
litigation against state officials. The Court's valid concern is to ensure
that not every injury caused by a state official acting under color of state
law will constitute a fourteenth amendment due process violation, thereby
rendering section 1983 a "font of tort law."1 8 The following analysis of
the obstacles a section 1983 plaintiff faces in stating and prevailing on
a cause of action indicates the facts and circumstances under which the
Court may meaningfully hold that a claim based on negligence is actionable
under section 1983.
Constitutional Deprivations: Causation and Duty Requirements
Before the courts will find that a state official has deprived the plain-
tiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and
laws, the plaintiff must prove causation in the sense that a public official
must have been individually responsible in order to be subjected to liability
under section 1983. The Supreme Court enunciated this principle of causa-
tion for constitutional violations remediable under section 1983 in Rizzo
v. Goode,'°9 in which the plaintiffs, who were residents of Philadelphia,
sought injunctive relief, inter alia, against the Philadelphia police force
for various abuses."' The district court found that "when a pattern of
frequent police violations of rights is shown, the law is clear that injunc-
tive relief may be granted.""' After rejecting the lower court's general
approach as a means of preventing potential police misconduct, the Court,
in a majority opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, held that before a
person may be named in an injunction, he must be shown to have deprived
the plaintiff of constitutional rights by his own conduct."2
Another causation-related check on the finding of any actionable depriva-
tion of a constitutional or federal statutory right in a section 1983 suit
is the Court's announcement in Monell v. Department of Social Services"3
,0' See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
"' See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 544 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
Justice Rehnquist, the author of the plurality opinion in Parratt and the majority opinion
in Paul, illustrated this concern with the hypothetical case of a plaintiff who brings a S
1983 suit against a state official as the result of an automobile accident. Id.
109 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
11o For a complete record of the allegations, see Council of Orgs. of Phila. Police Account-
ability & Responsibility v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1291-92 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
.. Id. at 1318 (emphasis added). The court of appeals affirmed this decision. Goode v.
Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974).
"' See 423 U.S. at 377. One commentator has criticized the Rizzo decision and argued
that federal courts should use an organizational approach to injunctive relief in S 1983
suits. See Hansen, supra note 93, at 241-64.
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
114 See text accompanying notes 73-77 supra. One court has interpreted Monell's causa-
tion principle as requiring two elements: first, that the city had notice of prior misbehavior,
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that vicarious liability is not actionable under section 1983.114 The Monell
Court cited Rizzo as authority for this principle."5 Monell and Rizzo read
together seem to preclude individual liability -regardless of the defen-
dant's state of mind-when the plaintiff's theory of recovery is based
either upon a pattern of misconduct by a governmental entity or upon
a supervisory official's failure to act in the absence of notice of miscon-
duct by his subordinates.
More fundamentally, the threshold question in any section 1983 case
is whether a fourteenth amendment violation has occurred.' The only
time the defendant's state of mind should be relevant in determining
whether a cause of action has been stated in section 1983 suit is when
the courts are inquiring into whether the defendant owed a fourteenth
amendment duty to the plaintiff.'17 The notion that a defendant must owe
a duty of constitutional magnitude to the plaintiff before a section 1983
action may be successfully maintained suggests that the Court's current
state-of-mind analysis for determining whether a cause of action has been
established, although currently not well defined, is nevertheless evolving
in such a manner that if the Court in the future were to hold on the merits
that negligence is actionable under section 1983, such a holding would
not transform section 1983 into a "font of tort law." The requirement
under section 1983 of a duty of constitutional magnitude owed to the plain-
tiff will ensure that the distinctively federal nature of section 1983 will
be preserved, despite any superficial similarity that may exist between
deprivatons of constitutional rights intended to be remedied under sec-
tion 1983 on the one hand, and injuries more appropriately addressed
under a state's substantive law of torts on the other.
As recently as in Parratt v. Taylor,"' the Court has intimated that dif-
ferent constitutional violations may require different states of mind on
the part of the defendant to be congnizable under section 1983. In Parratt
the plaintiff, an inmate of a Nebraska prison, alleged a deprivation of
property without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment when prison officials negligently lost a hobby kit the plaintiff had
ordered through the mail.' Reversing the district court's holding that
the deprivation of the plaintiff's property was without due process and
that negligent action by state officals can be a basis for liability under
section 1983,11 the Parratt Court in dicta noted that different constitu-
and second, that the failure to act upon such notice caused the injury. See Herrera v. Valen-
tine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1224 (8th Cir. 1981).115 436 U.S. at 692 (citing 423 U.S. 370-71).
,IS. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION 63 (1979).
" See id. at 60.
I" 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
", Id. at 529.
' Id. at 531. The Court based its reversal on its conclusion that procedural due process
was not denied, rather than on a conclusion that negligence cannot be the basis for S 1983
liability. See id. at 543-44.
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tional rights might require varying states of mind by the defendant to
be remediable under section 1983.121
Although the Supreme Court has never explained why different
constitutional violations will require different states of mind to be action-
able, the most likely explanation is that the Court is more inclined to
find negligence actionable under a specific provision of the Bill of Rights
not because these rights are more important than other constitutional
rights, but rather because under these rights there is a more clearly
defined concept of duty on the part of state officials. This is particularly
true, for example, with prisoners' eighth amendment claims against
wardens or fourth amendment claims against the police, for in both areas
state officials in the performance of their duties are required to be at-
tuned to the constitutional rights of inmates and the general public,
respectively." Bare due process claims, however, detract from the federal
nature of section 1983 because they often are premised on deprivations
of property or liberty interests defined by and remediable under state law."
Requirement of Violation of "Clearly Established" Rights as a Safeguard
Against Liability for Negligence
The Court's current state-of-mind inquiry (in terms of the defendant's
duty to the plaintiff and the nature of the constitutional right allegedly
violated) for determining whether there is a cause of action is closely related
to the state-of-mind analysis used when the Court considers the defense
of qualified immunity. One of the key criteria for determining whether
the defendant is afforded a qualified immunity in light of Procunier v.
21 Id at 534 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. at 139-40). Some lower courts have
also indicated that whether negligence shall be a basis for liability will depend on the par-
ticular constitutional right allegedly violated. See, e.g., Norton v. McKeon, 444 F. Supp.
384, 387 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136, 150 (E.D. Pa.
1977). Judge Lord wrote both the Norton and Santiago opinions and in Santiago cited Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), as support for the principle that the state-of-mind require-
ment should depend on the underlying constitutional deprivation. 435 F. Supp. at 150. Estelle
involved a prisoner's S 1983 claim premised on medical malpractice and alleging an eighth
amendment violation. The Court held that in order to establish an eighth amendment violation
based on medical malpractice, the plaintiff must prove intentional conduct. See 429 U.S.
at 104. Justice Stevens, in dissent, stated that the "[s]ubjective motivation [of the defen-
dant] may well determine what, if any, remedy is appropriate.... However, whether the
constitutional standard has been violated should turn on the character of the punishment
rather than the motivation of the individual who inflicted it." Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissen-
ting). Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's opinion that a showing of intent is
necessary to prove an eighth amendment violation. Id. at 116 n.13.
"= Fourth and eighth amendment claims are cited here only as examples and are not
meant to be all-inclusive. For an excellent discussion and analysis of S 1983 claims accord-
ing to the underlying constitutional deprivation involved, see S. NAHMOD, supra note 116,
at 65-83.
" See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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Navarete,2 4 is whether the constitutional right allegedly infringed was
"clearly established" at the time of the injury.' The criterion of a "clear-
ly established" right-like the causation and duty factors in the cause-of-
action determination-would act as a further safeguard against unlimited
proliferation of section 1983 suits were the Court to rule on the merits
that negligence will suffice to state a cause of action.
A claim based on negligence would rarely survive a defendant's affir-
mative defense because one of the main factors used to determine whether
the plaintiff's right was "clearly established" is whether it is included
within the scope of the official's duty to know the law. 2 ' Moreover, the
"clearly established" rights doctrine has become an amorphous concept
and the courts have been reluctant to find instances in which the alleged
injury involved "clearly established" rights."' Thus, only in those rare
instances when the courts find rights "clearly established" would the plain-
tiff have a chance of surviving the defendant's defense of subjective good
faith." If the courts often found that the rights involved in section 1983
suits were "clearly established," state officials would be held to a high
standard of care in the execution of their official duties to keep abreast
of and to analyze the law affecting rights secured by the Constitution
and laws." The "clearly established" rights analysis during the qualified
immunity determiniation, therefore, sheds light on why the Court has
had trouble in articulating why negligent conduct might violate some con-
stitutional rights so as to be actionable under section 1983, but not others.
Only when the state official has a duty to know the law in relation to
the specific clearly established constitutional right alleged to have been
n, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
See notes 67-71 & accompanying text supra.
' See note 71 & accompanying text supra. The concepts of a "clearly established" right
and a duty of constitutional magnitude are thus related in the sense that each helps to
define the other. A right that is clearly established imposes a duty of care of constitutional
magnitude on state officials to refrain from causing deprivations of that right; conversely,
a right that is clearly established may be said to fall within the scope of an official's duty
to know and to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. See id.
I" See, e.g., Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d at 163 (right defined only "in broad outline,"
so not "clearly established"). Moreover, sometimes the courts find the defendant immune
when the official's action violated a "clearly established" right. See, e.g., Inmates v. Greenholtz,
567 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1977); Farr v. Chesney, 437 F. Supp. 521 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
' See notes 67-69 & accompanying text supra.
1 Requiring state officials to keep abreast of changes in the law involves a multitude
of problems. Chief among these problems is the unreasonableness of expecting officials
to interpret fresh decisions properly, as well as the fear expressed in Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967), that state officials might be required in effect to predict the future course
of constitutional law. The problem is exacerbated by the differing competencies of state
officials and courts to interpret fresh precedent. Further difficulties are posed by the case
of an official acting upon advice of counsel or pursuant to a state statute or regulation
valid and in force at the time of action. Such safe harbors might be nullified by an expan-
sive view of "clearly established" rights.
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violated will negligence be enough to both state a cause of action and
support liability.13 Only in that instance will the Court hold on the merits
that negligence is meaningfully actionable under section 1983.
CONCLUSION
Since the Court's opinion in Monroe v. Pape, there has been judicial
confusion over what role the state-of-mind analysis should play in a sec-
tion 1983 suit. If Baker v. McCollan and Parratt v. Taylor read together
mean that the defendant's state of mind may be irrelevant to pleading
a prima facie section 1983 cause of action, the same cannot be said as
to other aspects of a suit under section 1983. However, it is only when
a court is determining whether a defendant should be afforded a qualified
immunity defense against the plaintiff's action for monetary damages that
any clear and meaningful state-of-mind determination is presently
undertaken.
The Court seems to intimate, without fully explaining its position, that
the defendant's state of mind may be relevant to the threshold question
of whether there has been a constitutional violation actionable under sec-
tion 1983. What state of mind on the part of the defendant is ultimately
required to maintain a section 1983 action may depend on which particular
right secured by the Constitution and laws the plaintiff alleges has been
violated.
One explanation of why the courts have had trouble in articulating or
deciding on the merits that negligence is actionable under section 1983
is due to the close connection between the "clearly established" rights
doctrine, which is currently a part of the qualified immunity defense, and
the scope of an official's duty toward the plaintiff. It appears that before
a plaintiff will be able not only to state a cause of action under section
1983, but also to prevail on the merits, the plaintiff will have to prove
that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of constitutional magnitude
with respect to the deprivation of a "clearly established" right. Even if
the courts were to find negligence actionable under section 1983, there
are thus sufficient inherent safeguards in a section 1983 suit to preclude
unlimited litigation and liability.
WILLIAM A. LOCKHART
See notes 67-71 & accompanying text supra. The concept of a pre-existing duty in
the constitutional sense provides a nexus between the distinct problems of determining
whether a cause of action had been established and determining whether liability for damages
should be imposed in a S 1983 suit.
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